Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Ricky Reese was convicted of capital murder and of being a felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced to an aggregate term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Appellant subsequently filed in the trial court a petition seeking postconviction relief on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the circuit court denied the petition. On appeal, Appellant contended that the trial court erred in denying his petition because of his counsel's failure to raise at trial and on direct appeal the material-witness rule in Smith v. State, which states that the requirement of producing all material witnesses is a necessary component of the State's burden of proof to show that a confession is voluntary. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to show that an objection to the prosecution's failure to produce witnesses based on the material-witness rule would have been successful because the rule was inapplicable in this case, and therefore, counsel was not ineffective for failing to make the objection on that basis.

A jury found petitioner Greg Hogue guilty of capital murder for the death of an owner of a convenience store and sentenced Hogue to life imprisonment without parole. Hogue subsequently filed a petition in the Supreme Court seeking leave to file a petition in the circuit court for writ of error coram nobis, alleging that the prosecution withheld five documents from the defense in violation of the requirements of Brady v. Maryland. The Supreme Court denied Hogue's petition, holding that Hogue failed to set forth a basis for issuance of the writ because (1) defense counsel was aware of the existence of four of the documents, and (2) Hogue failed to demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability that the judgment of conviction would not have been rendered had the document in the last document been disclosed at trial.

Appellant Adam Davis was convicted of capital murder and attempted first-degree murder, each having a firearm enhancement, and was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not clearly err in determining that counsel was not ineffective where (1) Appellant failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to properly renew his motion for directed verdict as to both charges; and (2) Appellant's remaining allegations regarding trial counsel's ineffectiveness were entirely conclusory in nature in that there was no factual substantiation to demonstrate how counsel's conduct specifically prejudiced his defense.

Appellant was serving terms on three sentences for three convictions when he filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The circuit court denied the petition without a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err by not conducing a hearing on Appellant's petition because Appellant failed to demonstrate probable cause for the issuance of the writ; (2) the circuit court committed no error if it did not make written findings to support its decision; (3) Appellant's claim that his conviction for delivery of a controlled substance was invalid stated no grounds upon which the writ could properly issue and therefore failed; and (4) any challenges to Appellant's convictions for second-degree escape were moot because the sentences he received for those offenses expired.

Appellant Justin Anderson was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for the murder of an elderly woman. Anderson filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) (a) Anderson did not overcome the presumption that trial counsel's handling of the issue of Anderson's mental retardation was the result of reasonable professional judgment, (b) the fact that a doctor who participated in the issue of Anderson's mental retardation was later discredited did not warrant a remand, and (c) Anderson was not allowed to revisit the issue of conflicting expert evidence regarding Anderson's mental retardation and mental health presented at his trial; (2) Anderson failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the admission of statements Anderson to police and counsel's failure to challenge aspects of the statements in relation to his mental retardation; and (3) the circuit court did not err in ruling that no mental impairment on the part of defense counsel had been proven.

Sherman Watson, who was previously convicted on a criminal matter, filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief. The circuit court denied the petition, finding it did not have jurisdiction because the petition was not timely filed. The Supreme Court twice remanded for findings of fact as to the date of tender of the petition. On the second remand, the trial court once again failed to make specific findings as to the date that the petition was first tendered to the clerk and rejected. For the third time, the Supreme Court again remanded for findings of fact on the date of tender to the circuit clerk of Appellant's petition, holding that the circuit court's order did not provide an answer to the specific question of what date or dates petitions were tendered to the circuit clerk.

Appellant Reginald Richardson was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. Because the offense was committed within 1000 feet of a public-housing facility, Appellant's sentence was enhanced pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 5-64-411(a)(4). The court of appeals affirmed. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, which the circuit court denied without a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court's decision to render its order without a hearing was not clearly erroneous as the record showed Appellant's allegations to be without merit; (2) any error on the part of Appellant's counsel to object to a wording error contained in one verdict form was harmless, and Appellant failed to prove prejudice; and (3) trial counsel was not effective for failing to object to the circuit court's failure to arraign him on the enhanced charge because Appellant waived formal arraignment and was not prejudiced by the lack of a formal arraignment on the enhancement.

Appellant William Hale was convicted of internet stalking and was sentenced to 276 months' imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, asserting several instances of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutor misconduct. The circuit court denied Appellant's petition. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court, holding (1) Appellant's series of allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel were entirely conclusory in nature in that there was no factual substantiation to demonstrate how Appellant's counsel specifically prejudiced the defense; and (2) Appellant's claims of prosecutorial misconduct were not cognizable in a petition for postconviction relief.

Appellant Michael Gilliland was convicted for rape and sexual assault. The Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief, which the circuit court denied. At issue on appeal was whether Appellant filed his petition within sixty days of the date that the mandate issued in accordance with Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2(c). The Supreme Court (1) remanded the case for findings of fact concerning the date of tender of the petition as the Court could not ascertain the actual date of tender of the petition in this case; and (2) declared the State's motion for extension of time to file its brief in conjunction with its motion to dismiss moot.

Appellant, a legal, permanent resident of the United States, pled guilty to one count of maintaining a drug premise. Later, Appellant was placed in a removal proceeding in immigration court. Appellant filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, asserting that his trial counsel never informed him of the possible adverse immigration consequences that could result if he pled guilty to the charge. The circuit court denied Appellant's petition, finding that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim could have been raised in a petition for postconviction relief and did not provide a basis for coram-nobis relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was not cognizable in a coram-nobis proceeding.