Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Appellant was charged with criminal nonsupport, he filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that he had been held in criminal contempt for nonpayment of child support, and therefore, the State was precluded from prosecuting him for the same conduct based on double-jeopary grounds. The circuit court found that Appellant had been held in criminal contempt for an arrearage that had accrued through 2003, and therefore, the State was barred from prosecuting Appellant criminally for nonpayment that occurred prior to that date. The State subsequently amended its information charging Appellant with criminal nonsupport by calculating his arrearage from 2003 until 2010. Appellant filed a second motion to dismiss, arguing that criminal nonsupport was a continuing offense and that the state was constitutionally prohibited from punishment Appellant multiple times for nonpayment. The circuit court denied the motion, finding that criminal nonsupport was not a continuing offense and that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not not prosecution of Appellant for any arrearage accruing after 2003. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's prior contempt proceedings did not present a double-jeopardy bar to the State's prosecution for criminal nonsupport in this instance.

Appellant Erickson Dimas-Martinez was convicted of capital murder and aggravated robbery and sentenced to death and life imprisonment, respectively. The Supreme Court reversed Appellant's conviction and sentence, holding that the circuit court erred in failing to dismiss a juror who disregarded the circuit court's instructions and, thereafter, in failing to grant Appellant's motion for a mistrial based on allegations of juror misconduct. The fact that one juror fell asleep during the guilt phase of the trial, which was brought to the circuit court's attention, and the fact that a second juror was posting on his Twitter account during the case and continued to do so even after being questioned by the circuit court, constituted juror misconduct. Additionally, the Court concluded that the appropriate standard a circuit court should apply in determining whether to submit an aggravating circumstance to the jury is that of substantial evidence, and the Court would no longer follow the standard utilized in Willett v. State and its progeny. Remanded for a new trial.

Appellant Carl Willis was convicted of second-degree sexual assault. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus containing claims concerning defects in the information that charged him. The circuit court denied the petition. Before the Supreme Court was Appellant's motion for an extension of time in which to file his brief. The Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motion moot, holding that because Appellant's challenges to the information were not supported by the record as jurisdictional challenges, Appellant stated no basis to support issuance of the writ, the petition was without merit, and Appellant could not prevail on appeal.

Appellant Deandra Stephenson was found guilty by a jury of two counts of capital murder and one count of committing a terroristic act. Appellant subsequently filed two petitions for postconviction relief. The circuit court denied both petitions after a hearing. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the circuit court, and thus the appellate court, was without jurisdiction to consider either of Appellant's petitions where (1) Appellant's first petition was unverified in violation of Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1, and (2) Appellant's second petition was untimely because he filed his verified petition nine months after the mandate issued in violation of the time limitations imposed in Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2(c).

In 2000, Appellant Karl Roberts was convicted of the capital murder of a twelve-year-old and was sentenced to death by lethal injection. Appellant signed a waiver of his right to pursue an appeal and postconviction remedies. In 2003, the circuit court entered an order stating that Robert had knowingly and intelligently waived all rights to postconviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed. In 2008, Roberts filed a petition for postconviction relief under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.5. The circuit court denied the petition, finding that the petition was untimely filed and Roberts was not entitled to relief. The Supreme Court dismissed Roberts's appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding (1) where the ninety-day filing period under rule 37.5 has expired and a waiver of postconviction relief has been affirmed by the Court, a petitioner must file the appropriate motion to reopen postconviction proceedings before a rule 37 petition can be brought in circuit court; and (2) because this was not done in the present case, the circuit court was without jurisdiction to entertain Roberts's rule 37.5 petition, and the Supreme Court was likewise without jurisdiction to hear an appeal from any decision of the circuit court in the matter.

Appellant Frank Randolph was found guilty by a jury of robbery, theft of property, and kidnapping and was sentenced as a habitual offender to twenty-five years' imprisonment for each offense to be served consecutively. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, contending (1) his consecutive sentences were illegal because the trial judge referred to the terror experienced by the victim, which was not a fact admitted by Appellant or found by the jury, and (2) it was a violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy for him to be sentenced for kidnapping. The circuit court denied the petition without a hearing. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Appellant's petition because the petition did not state a basis to warrant issuance of the writ.

Petitioner Jamie Lee was found guilty by a jury of capital murder and four counts of first-degree battery. Petitioner (1) filed a petition with the Supreme Court to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that certain testimony was deleted from the trial transcript, and the court reporter, prosecutor, and trial judge committed egregious misconduct by misleading the appellate court; and (2) asked the Court grant him leave to proceed with a belated petition for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court (1) denied Petitioner's petition because Petitioner did not state a ground for the writ; and (2) denied Petitioner's request because there was no provision in Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1 for a belated petition.

Appellant Billy Kelley was convicted of rape and sentenced to life imprisonment as a habitual offender. Kelley filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that his trial attorney was ineffective for not preserving a Confrontation Clause challenge for appellate review. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court's denial of postconviction relief was not clear error where, pursuant to the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, Kelley failed to demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's failure to obtain a ruling on his Confrontation Clause objection, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.

After a jury trial, Gary Williams was found guilty of first-degree murder, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of marijuana. Williams subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call witnesses and for misadvising him concerning his right to testify. After a hearing, the trial court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not clearly err in denying Williams's petition because (1) trial counsel's decision not to call certain witnesses was a matter of trial strategy, and counsel's performance was not deficient as a result; (2) pursuant to case law, an attorney's advice to a defendant on whether to testify and the defendant's decision to take or not take the stand are not grounds for postconviction relief predicated on ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) there was no defective representation by trial counsel where counsel failed to make a record of the waiver of William's fundamental right to testify.

Appellant Myka Talley was found guilty by a jury of kidnapping and seven counts of rape and was sentenced to eight consecutive terms of life imprisonment. Sixty-one days after the mandate issued, Appellant filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1. The trial court denied the petition. Before the Supreme Court was Appellant's motion for an extension of time to file his brief-in-chief. The Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motion moot, holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition because the petition filed in the trial court was not filed within sixty days after the mandate was issued pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2(c).