Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A jury found Appellant Kenneth Tucker guilty of two counts of delivery of a controlled substance. The court of appeals affirmed. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief, which the trial court denied. Before the Supreme Court was Appellant's petition for writ of certiorari to complete the record and his amended motion for a copy of the record, appointment of counsel, and a stay of the briefing schedule. The Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motion and petition moot, holding that the petition for postconviction relief was not properly verified because the petition did not include the appropriate affidavit required by Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1 and there was not explicit leave from the trial court for Appellant to file an unverified petition.

Appellees were charged with five felonies involving the manufacture, possession, and delivery of methamphetamine and paraphernalia. The charges resulted from a single incident when sheriff's deputies attempted a "knock and announce" at a residence after receiving information that a methamphetamine laboratory was active and currently in progress. The State granted Appellees' motion to suppress. The State appealed, contending that the circuit court erred as a matter of law in its interpretation of the "reasonably foreseeable" test concerning police-created exigent circumstances adopted in Mann v. State. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) it was not a proper State appeal under Ark. R. App. P.-Crim. 3 because the State failed to produce a record on appeal that demonstrated that the circuit court actually relied on Mann and misinterpreted that case in reaching its decision; and (2) therefore, the State could not satisfy the requirement of Rule 3(d) that the correct and uniform administration of the criminal law required the Court's review of the appeal.

Appellant David Smoak was convicted by a jury of internet stalking of a child. Smoak appealed, arguing (1) the circuit court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict because there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction; and (2) the circuit court erred as a matter of law by denying his attempt to utilize an entrapment defense and by failing to instruct the jury on entrapment. The Supreme Court (2) affirmed the circuit court's holding that there was sufficient evidence to support Smoak's conviction; but (2) reversed the court's denial of Smoak's attempt to utilize an entrapment defense, holding that a defendant is entitled to an entrapment instruction whenever there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find entrapment, even if the defendant denies one or more elements of the crime. Remanded.

A jury found Appellant Jose Mendez guilty of rape, attempted murder, aggravated residential burglary, and aggravated assault. Appellant, who spoke only Spanish, asserted that the circuit court erred in admitting the State's translation of a statement he gave to the police in Spanish because it was not prepared by a qualified certified translator as required by Ark. R. Evid. 1009. The circuit court ruled that the statement was admissible and that the translator's certification went to the weight, rather than the admissibility, of the statement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State's translation should not have been admitted because not only was the State's translator uncertified, but the translator had taken and failed the certification exam; and (2) because the unqualified translation of Appellant's statement was introduced as an admission of guilt, the introduction of the translation was not harmless. Remanded.

Appellant Michael Cowan was convicted of two counts of sexual assault in the second degree and sentenced as a habitual offender. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, asserting four bases for the requested relief. The circuit court denied the petition without a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) Appellant's first three assertions were not properly before the Court; but (2) the trial court erred in denying Appellant the requested relief on his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to allow him to testify on his own behalf where the court did not enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting its determination that Appellant was entitled to no relief, and where Appellant's original petition for postconviction relief supported his claim.

Petitioner Antonio Coley was found guilty of aggravated robbery and forgery for a criminal episode at a convenience store. The Supreme Court affirmed. Petitioner later filed a pro se petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis, claiming that a fellow inmate at the department of correction confessed to Petitioner that he had committed the offenses. The Supreme Court denied the petition after noting that coram-nobis proceedings require that the claim of a third-party confession be raised before affirmance of the judgment, which was not done in this case.

James Butler was charged with engaging in sexual acts with a nine-year-old girl. After a trial, Butler was found guilty of two counts of rape and sentenced to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed. Butler subsequently filed a pro se petition with the Supreme Court to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis in the case, alleging almost twenty grounds for issuance of the writ. The Court denied the petition, holding (1) Butler's attacks on the sufficiency of the evidence, complaints of trial error, and allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel were not grounds for the writ; and (2) Butler's contention that a third party admitted to abuse of the victim did not contain a confession to the offenses of which Butler was accused and convicted, and therefore, did not warrant coram-nobis relief.

Appellant Charles Jones was convicted on four counts of rape. Appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1, listing four grounds of relief, including ineffective assistance of counsel and error by the trial court. The trial court denied the petition. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal, holding that Appellant did not state claims in his petition that, if cognizable, provided sufficient facts to support relief where (1) the claims of trial court error were not cognizable in a Rule 37.1 proceeding; and (2) Appellant did not provide any facts that would support a finding of prejudice in regard to his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Petitioner David Henderson was convicted of rape and sentenced to life. Petitioner subsequently filed a pro se motion seeking the use of the record, which the Supreme Court treated as one for a copy of the record or transcript at public expense. The Court denied the motion because (1) Petitioner's indigency alone did not entitle him to photocopying at public expense; (2) Petitioner did not show a compelling need for a copy of the record as documentary evidence of any specific claim; (3) Petitioner did not cite a particular ground for relief that required documentation in order for it to be effectively raised in a postconviction motion; and (4) Petitioner did not establish that there was any timely postconviction remedy available to him.

Appellant Sidney Harvey, an inmate incarcerated in the Arkansas Department of Correction, filed a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Act 1780 challenging his convictions for kidnapping and rape. The circuit court denied his petition. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal, holding that although the circuit court in which Appellant filed his habeas petition had jurisdiction to hear Appellant's claims, Appellant's petition failed to set forth a claim under the Act. Because Appellant did not meet the requirement that the identity of the perpetrator was at issue during the investigation or prosecution of the offense being challenged, Appellant did not have a viable claim for Act 1780 relief as to his offenses for kidnapping and rape.