Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A jury found Appellant Jose Mendez guilty of rape, attempted murder, aggravated residential burglary, and aggravated assault. Appellant, who spoke only Spanish, asserted that the circuit court erred in admitting the State's translation of a statement he gave to the police in Spanish because it was not prepared by a qualified certified translator as required by Ark. R. Evid. 1009. The circuit court ruled that the statement was admissible and that the translator's certification went to the weight, rather than the admissibility, of the statement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State's translation should not have been admitted because not only was the State's translator uncertified, but the translator had taken and failed the certification exam; and (2) because the unqualified translation of Appellant's statement was introduced as an admission of guilt, the introduction of the translation was not harmless. Remanded.

Appellant Michael Cowan was convicted of two counts of sexual assault in the second degree and sentenced as a habitual offender. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, asserting four bases for the requested relief. The circuit court denied the petition without a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) Appellant's first three assertions were not properly before the Court; but (2) the trial court erred in denying Appellant the requested relief on his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to allow him to testify on his own behalf where the court did not enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting its determination that Appellant was entitled to no relief, and where Appellant's original petition for postconviction relief supported his claim.

Petitioner Antonio Coley was found guilty of aggravated robbery and forgery for a criminal episode at a convenience store. The Supreme Court affirmed. Petitioner later filed a pro se petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis, claiming that a fellow inmate at the department of correction confessed to Petitioner that he had committed the offenses. The Supreme Court denied the petition after noting that coram-nobis proceedings require that the claim of a third-party confession be raised before affirmance of the judgment, which was not done in this case.

James Butler was charged with engaging in sexual acts with a nine-year-old girl. After a trial, Butler was found guilty of two counts of rape and sentenced to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed. Butler subsequently filed a pro se petition with the Supreme Court to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis in the case, alleging almost twenty grounds for issuance of the writ. The Court denied the petition, holding (1) Butler's attacks on the sufficiency of the evidence, complaints of trial error, and allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel were not grounds for the writ; and (2) Butler's contention that a third party admitted to abuse of the victim did not contain a confession to the offenses of which Butler was accused and convicted, and therefore, did not warrant coram-nobis relief.

Appellant Charles Jones was convicted on four counts of rape. Appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1, listing four grounds of relief, including ineffective assistance of counsel and error by the trial court. The trial court denied the petition. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal, holding that Appellant did not state claims in his petition that, if cognizable, provided sufficient facts to support relief where (1) the claims of trial court error were not cognizable in a Rule 37.1 proceeding; and (2) Appellant did not provide any facts that would support a finding of prejudice in regard to his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Petitioner David Henderson was convicted of rape and sentenced to life. Petitioner subsequently filed a pro se motion seeking the use of the record, which the Supreme Court treated as one for a copy of the record or transcript at public expense. The Court denied the motion because (1) Petitioner's indigency alone did not entitle him to photocopying at public expense; (2) Petitioner did not show a compelling need for a copy of the record as documentary evidence of any specific claim; (3) Petitioner did not cite a particular ground for relief that required documentation in order for it to be effectively raised in a postconviction motion; and (4) Petitioner did not establish that there was any timely postconviction remedy available to him.

Appellant Sidney Harvey, an inmate incarcerated in the Arkansas Department of Correction, filed a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Act 1780 challenging his convictions for kidnapping and rape. The circuit court denied his petition. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal, holding that although the circuit court in which Appellant filed his habeas petition had jurisdiction to hear Appellant's claims, Appellant's petition failed to set forth a claim under the Act. Because Appellant did not meet the requirement that the identity of the perpetrator was at issue during the investigation or prosecution of the offense being challenged, Appellant did not have a viable claim for Act 1780 relief as to his offenses for kidnapping and rape.

After Appellant was charged with criminal nonsupport, he filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that he had been held in criminal contempt for nonpayment of child support, and therefore, the State was precluded from prosecuting him for the same conduct based on double-jeopary grounds. The circuit court found that Appellant had been held in criminal contempt for an arrearage that had accrued through 2003, and therefore, the State was barred from prosecuting Appellant criminally for nonpayment that occurred prior to that date. The State subsequently amended its information charging Appellant with criminal nonsupport by calculating his arrearage from 2003 until 2010. Appellant filed a second motion to dismiss, arguing that criminal nonsupport was a continuing offense and that the state was constitutionally prohibited from punishment Appellant multiple times for nonpayment. The circuit court denied the motion, finding that criminal nonsupport was not a continuing offense and that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not not prosecution of Appellant for any arrearage accruing after 2003. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's prior contempt proceedings did not present a double-jeopardy bar to the State's prosecution for criminal nonsupport in this instance.

Appellant Erickson Dimas-Martinez was convicted of capital murder and aggravated robbery and sentenced to death and life imprisonment, respectively. The Supreme Court reversed Appellant's conviction and sentence, holding that the circuit court erred in failing to dismiss a juror who disregarded the circuit court's instructions and, thereafter, in failing to grant Appellant's motion for a mistrial based on allegations of juror misconduct. The fact that one juror fell asleep during the guilt phase of the trial, which was brought to the circuit court's attention, and the fact that a second juror was posting on his Twitter account during the case and continued to do so even after being questioned by the circuit court, constituted juror misconduct. Additionally, the Court concluded that the appropriate standard a circuit court should apply in determining whether to submit an aggravating circumstance to the jury is that of substantial evidence, and the Court would no longer follow the standard utilized in Willett v. State and its progeny. Remanded for a new trial.

Appellant Carl Willis was convicted of second-degree sexual assault. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus containing claims concerning defects in the information that charged him. The circuit court denied the petition. Before the Supreme Court was Appellant's motion for an extension of time in which to file his brief. The Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motion moot, holding that because Appellant's challenges to the information were not supported by the record as jurisdictional challenges, Appellant stated no basis to support issuance of the writ, the petition was without merit, and Appellant could not prevail on appeal.