Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Marion Riddell was found guilty by a jury of rape and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed. One hundred and sixty-eight days after the Court's mandate issued, Appellant filed in the trial court a pro se petition for "belated" postconviction relief. The trial court denied the petition. Before the Court was Appellant's pro se motion seeking a copy of the transcript of his trial. The Court dismissed the appeal and declared Appellant's motion moot, holding that the circuit court and appellate court lacked jurisdiction to consider Appellant's petition for postconviction relief where Appellant did not timely file his petition.

Appellant Sarah Lynn entered a negotiated plea of guilty to possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia. A judgment and disposition order showed that Lynn had entered a negotiated plea of guilty or nolo contendere on both charges and that she was sentenced pursuant to the First Offender Act, or Act 346. Lynn appealed from the judgment and disposition order. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that as a plea of guilty or nolo contendere tendered pursuant to Act 346 is not a conviction, and where there is no conviction there is no right to appeal, Lynn had no right of appeal from her Act 346 position because she did not meet the threshold requirement of being convicted of a misdemeanor or a felony.

Appellant Milton Hendrix was found guilty by a jury of second-degree sexual assault, a felony, and fourth-degree sexual assault, a misdemeanor. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief, which the trial court denied. Before the Supreme Court were Appellant's pro se motions for an extension of time to file his brief-in-chief and a copy of the record. The Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motions moot, holding that because the petition filed in the trial court was not timely filed, the trial court and appellate court lacked jurisdiction to consider Appellant's petition for postconviction relief.

Lydia Delgadio was convicted and sentenced for possession of drug paraphernalia and possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. The circuit court denied Delgado's petition for postconviction relief. Delgado filed a notice of appeal, nine days late. Delgado then filed a motion to file notice of appeal and designation of record out-of-time, which the Supreme Court treated as a motion for belated appeal. In the motion, Delgado stated that she mailed the notice of appeal before the deadline, and after the deadline the notice was returned for insufficient postage. The Court denied the motion, holding that the motion failed to establish good cause for not filing a timely notice of appeal.

Monica Brodie, an African-American female, was employed by the City of Jonesboro when she applied for a promotion. When she was informed that she was not be receiving the promotion, she submitted a letter of resignation. Brodie later filed a complaint against the City, alleging that the City failed to promote her on account of her race. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the City. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the circuit court did not properly evaluate this case under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework; and (2) the circuit court erred in treating Brodie's failure-to-promote claim as a case of constructive discharge where Brodie did not allege a constructive-discharge claim in her complaint or offer any evidence of constructive discharge.

Petitioner Michael Williams was found guilty of murder in the first degree, kidnapping, and aggravated assault. Williams subsequently filed a pro se petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis with respect to the first-degree murder conviction, claiming that exculpatory evidence was withheld from the defense at Petitioner's trial. The Supreme Court denied the writ where Petitioner did not establish that (1) the evidence was not available to the defense at the time of trial, (2) the evidence was suppressed by the State, and (3) there was a reasonable probability that the judgment of conviction would not have been rendered, or would have been prevented, had the information at issue been disclosed at trial.

After a jury trial, Petitioner Frank Williams was found guilty of capital murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed. The circuit court denied Williams' subsequent motion for postconviction relief, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Williams next filed a federal habeas corpus petition, which was denied. Williams eventually moved the Supreme Court to recall the mandates of its judgments denying Williams relief on both his direct appeal and petition for postconviction relief. At issue before the Court was the fact that the Williams jury erroneously marked a jury form, indicating that no evidence of mitigation was offered where evidence was clearly presented. The Court granted the motion and reversed the death sentence, concluding that the jury eliminated from its consideration all evidence presented of mitigating circumstances and sentenced Williams to death solely based on the aggravating circumstance, which was reversible error. Because the error was not discovered during Williams' direct appeal, there was a defect or breakdown in the appellate process in this death-penalty case, requiring a recall of the mandate and a reopening of Williams' direct appeal. Remanded for resentencing.

A jury found Appellant Kenneth Tucker guilty of two counts of delivery of a controlled substance. The court of appeals affirmed. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief, which the trial court denied. Before the Supreme Court was Appellant's petition for writ of certiorari to complete the record and his amended motion for a copy of the record, appointment of counsel, and a stay of the briefing schedule. The Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motion and petition moot, holding that the petition for postconviction relief was not properly verified because the petition did not include the appropriate affidavit required by Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1 and there was not explicit leave from the trial court for Appellant to file an unverified petition.

Appellees were charged with five felonies involving the manufacture, possession, and delivery of methamphetamine and paraphernalia. The charges resulted from a single incident when sheriff's deputies attempted a "knock and announce" at a residence after receiving information that a methamphetamine laboratory was active and currently in progress. The State granted Appellees' motion to suppress. The State appealed, contending that the circuit court erred as a matter of law in its interpretation of the "reasonably foreseeable" test concerning police-created exigent circumstances adopted in Mann v. State. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) it was not a proper State appeal under Ark. R. App. P.-Crim. 3 because the State failed to produce a record on appeal that demonstrated that the circuit court actually relied on Mann and misinterpreted that case in reaching its decision; and (2) therefore, the State could not satisfy the requirement of Rule 3(d) that the correct and uniform administration of the criminal law required the Court's review of the appeal.

Appellant David Smoak was convicted by a jury of internet stalking of a child. Smoak appealed, arguing (1) the circuit court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict because there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction; and (2) the circuit court erred as a matter of law by denying his attempt to utilize an entrapment defense and by failing to instruct the jury on entrapment. The Supreme Court (2) affirmed the circuit court's holding that there was sufficient evidence to support Smoak's conviction; but (2) reversed the court's denial of Smoak's attempt to utilize an entrapment defense, holding that a defendant is entitled to an entrapment instruction whenever there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find entrapment, even if the defendant denies one or more elements of the crime. Remanded.