Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The State appealed from a circuit court order dismissing its in rem forfeiture petition against real property located in Little Rock. The circuit court dismissed the petition based upon a finding that Ark. Code Ann. 5-42-204(c)(3) does not permit the State to pursue in rem forfeiture. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the case was moot because a settlement had been reached, and neither of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied in this case. Because the Court does not issue advisory opinions, the Court dismissed the appeal as moot. View "State v. First Serv. Bank of Greenbrier" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court where he was incarcerated. The circuit court dismissed the petition on May 31, 2012, and Petitioner sought reconsideration. The motion for reconsideration was denied on July 31, 2012. Petitioner did not file a notice of appeal from either order and sought leave in this motion to proceed with a belated appeal. The Supreme Court denied the motion to proceed with the appeal, holding that it was the duty of Petition to file a timely notice of appeal, and he did not establish good cause for his failure to do so. View "McDaniel v. Hobbs" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. Appellant's sentence was enhanced for committing the crimes within 1000 feet of a park. The court of appeals affirmed. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging (1) trial counsel had been ineffective, (2) the trial court erred in denying his motions for continuance and for appointment of new counsel, (3) he was entitled to more jail-time credit than he was given in the judgment-and-commitment order, and (4) his sentence was illegal. The circuit court denied Appellant's first, second, and fourth claims but left open the third claim pending the court's determination of how much jail-time credit Appellant was due. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal and declared the motion Appellant filed related to the appeal moot, holding that the circuit court did not err in its judgment and that Appellant could not prevail if his appeal were allowed to proceed. View "Lewis v.State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery, misdemeanor theft of property, and felony theft of property. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, asking that the videotape that showed the robbery of a gas station, which was one of the robberies of which Appellant was convicted, should be "tested." Appellant's petition was denied. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal and declared the motion Appellant filed in relation to the appeal moot, holding that Appellant could not prevail if his appeal were allowed to proceed, as Appellant's petition was little more than a bare allegation of innocence with no showing that there was good cause to order further scientific testing of evidence. View "Hutcherson v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape and first-degree sexual abuse and sentenced to life imprisonment and ten years' imprisonment, respectively. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court granted Defendant a new trial based on one ground of ineffective assistance as to the rape conviction and two grounds of ineffective assistance as to the sexual-abuse conviction. The State appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's grant of a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel, holding that, based on the standard of review under Strickland v. Washington, the circuit court was not clearly erroneous in its rulings on both of Defendant's convictions. View "State v. Estrada" on Justia Law

The Searcy County Counsel for Ethical Government (SCCEG) filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that Johnny Hinchey, a Searcy County Judge, neglected his duties of office when he failed to sell and convey a county-owned gravel crusher pursuant to the terms of Ark. Code Ann. 14-16-105. Judge Hinchey answered by asserting that the crusher had been determined to have no value to the County and was sold in accordance with the procedures of Ark. Code Ann. 14-16-106(c). The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Judge Hinchey. SCCEG appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in finding that section 14-16-106(c) was the relevant and applicable section to the sale of the crusher because, it contended, the crusher was not determined to be junk or scrap such that the statute would apply. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the gravel crusher was properly determined to be junk under section 14-16-106(c); and (2) the provisions of section 14-16-105 for sales of county property do not also apply to sales or disposal of surplus property under section 14-16-106. View "Searcy County Counsel for Ethical Gov't v. Hinchey" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged by felony information filed in March 2011 with the December 2001 rape of his then-thirteen-year-old stepdaughter. At the time of the alleged rape, the statute of limitations provided that a prosecution for rape must be commenced within six years of the commission of the rape. However, a savings provision in effect at the time extended the statute of limitations for an unreported rape for up to six years beyond the victim's eighteenth birthday. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the rape charge for lack of jurisdiction. The circuit court denied the motion, finding that the victim's teacher called the Child Abuse Hotline in 2005 to report the sexual abuse but that there was no proof that the Hotline had referred the call to any law enforcement agency, which allowed application of the savings statute. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for an extraordinary writ prohibiting the circuit court from trying him for rape because the statute of limitations had expired. The Supreme Court denied the writ, concluding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate he was clearly entitled to an extraordinary writ in this case. View "Morris v. Weaver" on Justia Law

On May 2, 2011, Appellant filed a complaint alleging medical malpractice against Appellees. That same day, in accordance with the law at that time, the circuit court issued summonses stating that Appellees had twenty days after service of the complaint to file an answer. On June 2, 2011, after the summonses had been issued but before Appellees were served, the Supreme Court amended its rules to provide that all defendants have thirty days after service of the complaint to file an answer. The Court stated that the amendment would be effective July 1, 2011. One appellee (Dudding) was served on July 28, 2011, and another (Goodman) on August 9, 2011. Dudding filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the summons was defective and the statute of limitations had expired. Goodman filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that process was defective because the summons served upon him indicated that he had twenty days, rather than thirty days, to file a responsive pleading. The circuit court granted both motions, concluding that the summonses were defective when served, and dismissed the complaint as time-barred. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the rule change did not invalidate summonses issued before July 1, 2011. View "May v. Coleman" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted in 2011 on charges of third-degree battery and rape and sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 240 months imprisonment. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Appellant was first charged in 1997 with the crimes reflected in the judgment challenged in the habeas petition. In 1998, Appellant entered a negotiated plea to those charges. In 2001, the circuit court found the judgment entered on the plea imposed an illegal sentence and granted a petition for writ of habeas corpus on that basis. The prosecuting attorney refiled the original charges, and, following a jury trial, the circuit court entered a judgment reflecting the sentence Appellant now served. In denying Appellant's habeas corpus petition, the circuit court found the issues Appellant raised had previously been settled under the law-of-the-case doctrine or were not cognizable as trial-level error. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the law-of-the-case doctrine applied to some of Appellant's arguments; (2) Appellant's argument concerning a speedy-trial violation failed because the claim was not cognizable in proceedings for a writ of habeas corpus; and (3) the Court was precluded from considering Appellant's final argument raised for the first time on appeal. View "Kelly v. Norris" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted on criminal charges and sentenced to a term of incarceration. Petitioner subsequently filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1. The circuit court denied the petition for failure to comply with Rule 37.1(c), which requires that the petition be accompanied by an affidavit that is sworn before a notary attesting that Petitioner has read the petition and that the facts stated in the petition are true to the best of his belief. The Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner's appeal and declared Petitioner's related motion moot, holding that the petition did not bear the sworn verification required by the rule, and thus, the circuit court and Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition. View "Holt v. State" on Justia Law