Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Holline and William Parsons (Plaintiffs) were enrolled in Today's Option, a Medicare Advantage Plan sponsored by the Pyramid Life Insurance Company (Pyramid). After Plaintiffs were each disenrolled from their respective plans, they brought suit against Pyramid, asserting numerous state law claims. The circuit court granted Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in part declaring that the Medicare Act did not provide the exclusive remedy for Plaintiffs' claims in this case. Pyramid then moved for Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b) certification and a stay pending appeal, requesting permission to file an interlocutory appeal on the issues of whether Plaintiffs' state-law claims arose under the Medicare Act and whether their claims, to the extent they did not arise under the Act, were expressly preempted by the Act. The circuit court certified this appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b). The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice, holding that the finding supporting Rule 54(b) certification was in error. View "Pyramid Life Ins. Co. v. Parsons" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of rape and one count of sexual indecency with a minor for the rape of his two granddaughters and sexual indecencies on a third granddaughter. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to sever charges into separate trials, as the acts alleged were not part of a single scheme or plan. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Defendant's motion without reaching Defendant's argument because Defendant failed to renew his motion to sever after his pretrial motion for severance was overruled, and therefore, Defendant waived his right to severance. View "Pruitt v. State" on Justia Law

In 2008, after a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery, three counts of kidnapping, attempted capital murder, theft of property, aggravated assault, felony fleeing, and misdemeanor fleeing. The court of appeals affirmed. Appellant subsequently filed a timely petition for postconviction relief. The postconviction court denied the petition. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and declared Appellant's petition for writ of certiorari to complete the record moot, holding that because Appellant's petition was not in compliance with Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1(c), which requires the petition be accompanied by a correctly verified affidavit, it should not have been accepted for filing, and it did not act to confer jurisdiction on the trial court to consider the merits of the petition. View "Page v. State" on Justia Law

In 1998, Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 720 months' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed. In 2011, Appellant filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Act 1780 of 2001, contending that DNA and fingerprint testing should be performed on a rubber mask that was introduced into evidence at his trial. The trial court denied the petition on the basis that it was not timely filed. Appellant lodged an appeal and sought to supplement the record on appeal. The Supreme Court denied the motion and dismissed the appeal, holding that Appellant failed to rebut the presumption against timeliness because the testing suggested by Appellant was either available at the time of his trial or not shown to be substantially more probative than technology available at that time. View "King v. State" on Justia Law

State Farm filed a complaint for negligence against Appellant, alleging that Appellant was at fault in an automobile accident with State Farm's insured. Appellant counterclaimed, alleging that State Farm was unjustly enriched as a result of having engaged in the deceptive and unlawful business practice of causing collection-style letters to be mailed in an attempt to collect unadjudicated, potential subrogation claims as debts. Appellant's counterclaim identified two putative classes. State Farm filed a motion to strike the class allegations. Rather than granting the motion to strike class allegations, the circuit court denied class certification "for the reasons stated in State Farm's motion." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court acted without due consideration of the Court's foregoing case law on typicality, commonality, and predominance and therefore abused its discretion in prematurely denying class certification at the early pleading stage of this case. Remanded. View "Kersten v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err by failing to grant a directed verdict, as the State introduced substantial evidence that Defendant acted with the purpose to kill the victim; and (2) the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on his affirmative defense of mental disease or defect, as the issue of Defendant's mental state was properly submitted to the jury and Defendant failed to prove that affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. View "Kaufman v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant, an inmate, filed a pro se complaint seeking an injunction to require Arkansas Secretary of State Mark Martin to place Appellant's name as a candidate for President of the United States on the 2012 Democratic primary ballot and to register all convicted felons to vote in that primary election. The circuit court granted Martin's motion to dismiss the complaint. Appellant appealed and filed a motion seeking permission to file a supplemental brief. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot and declared the motion moot, holding (1) because the election for which Appellant wanted his name placed on the ballot had already occurred, and the time for registering to vote in that election had passed, the appealed question was moot; and (2) neither exception to the mootness doctrine applied here. View "Judd v. Martin" on Justia Law

Four independent shippers, all located outside Arkansas, engaged Western Brokerage, a transportation broker in Arizona, to arrange for the transportation of produce from Arizona to Pennsylvania and New York. Western Brokerage requested carriers. Hotfoot, an Arkansas trucking company, agreed to transport multiple loads. Hotfoot engaged Freight Ambulance, an Arkansas company, to deliver the produce. After the delivery was made, Hotfoot unsuccessfully made a demand on Western Brokerage for the payment of the unpaid balance. Hotfoot subsequently filed an amended complaint against the four independent shippers and Western Brokerage for breach of contract. The Pulaski County circuit court granted Defendants' motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. On appeal, Appellants limited their arguments to Shipping Point Marketing (SPM), one of the independent shippers, and SPM's president and the president of Western Brokerage (collectively, Appellees). The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that questions of fact existed surrounding the personal jurisdiction of Appellees. View "Hotfoot Logistics LLC v. Shipping Point Mktg., Inc." on Justia Law

Circle D Contractors filed suit in district court to collect from the Bartletts money owed for the installation of a swimming pool. The district court ruled in favor of Circle D. The Barletts appealed. Circle D did not refile an additional complaint within thirty days, and the Barletts moved to dismiss Circle D's complaint as untimely. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, ruling that Circle D had failed to strictly comply with the requirements of District Court Rule 9 by failing to timely refile its complaint in circuit court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) only substantial compliance with the rule that a plaintiff refile its complaint in circuit court is required; and (2) Circle D substantially complied with rule 9 because all of its pleadings that were previously filed in district court were filed in circuit court, albeit by the Bartletts, and moreover, Circle D also refiled its complaint in circuit court. Remanded. View "Circle D Contractors, Inc. v. Bartlett" on Justia Law

Wanda Stephens purchased property in Little Rock consisting of Tract A and Tract B. In 2001, Wanda executed a quitclaim deed to the Stephens Family Limited Partnership (SFLP) and mortgaged the property to Regions Mortgage. In 2002, Wanda executed a warranty deed conveying Tract A to herself for life with a remainder to Greg Stephens and his heirs. In 2005, Wanda mortgaged Tract B of the land to Chase Bank. Regions Bank (Region) subsequently made a loan to Wanda, taking as collateral a mortgage on Tract A and Tract B. Wanda defaulted on the first mortgage, and Regions Mortgage foreclosed on both tracts. $308,828 remained from the sale. Chase and Regions asserted claims to the monies, and SFLP and the Stephens heirs intervened. All parties claimed to be first in priority. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment against Chase, finding that the interests of Regions, SFLP, and the Stephens heirs were superior to Chase's. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that because the question of whether Chase had actual notice of the Stephens heirs' claim on the property was a question of fact, summary judgment was inappropriate. View "Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Regions Bank" on Justia Law