Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of capital murder and aggravated robbery and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. The Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the circuit court's denial of Defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus, concluding that Defendant's sentence did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments even though Defendant was only fourteen years old at the time he committed the crimes. The U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that Arkansas's sentencing scheme violated the Eighth Amendment because it imposed a mandatory sentence of life without parole upon Defendant despite his having been under age eighteen at the time he committed capital murder. On remand, the Supreme Court reversed the denial of the petition for writ of habeas corpus and issued the writ. Remanded for resentencing. View "Jackson v. Norris" on Justia Law

A construction company and its principals (collectively, Appellants) hired a plumbing company (Peters), excavation company (Bostic), and marble company (Esquire) as subcontractors for the construction of Appellants' home. After Buyers purchased the home, Buyers filed a complaint against Appellants, alleging negligence and breach of the implied warranties of habitability, sound workmanship, and proper construction. Appellants filed a third-party complaint against Peters, Bostic, and Esquire, alleging several causes of action. Bostic subsequently filed cross-claims against Peters, and Peters filed cross-claims against both Bostic and Esquire. Thereafter, the circuit court (1) granted Peters' motion for summary judgment on the third-party complaint, (2) granted summary judgment for Bostic on Peters' cross-claim, and (3) granted Esquire's motion for summary judgment on the third-party complaint. Appellants appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction because a final order had not been entered disposing of all the claims. View "J-McDaniel Constr. Co. v. Dale E. Peters Plumbing Ltd." on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life in prison without parole. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. Appellant subsequently filed a timely pro se petition for postconviction relief, alleging that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After a hearing, the circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's arguments that the trial court erred by not allowing him to subpoena a juror from his trial and by limiting his examination of a witness at the hearing were precluded from review; (2) the circuit court did not err by not permitting Appellant to amend his petition; (3) the circuit court did not prejudicially err by not invoking the rule to exclude Appellant's trial counsel from hearing the testimony of other witnesses; and (4) the circuit court did not err in denying Appellant's petition for postconviction relief. View "Adams v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for several crimes, and the circuit court set Defendant's bail at $75,000. A bail-bond agent executed the bond and Defendant was released from jail. When the bail-bond company attempted to present Defendant's check for payment, it found the account had been closed. Defendant was subsequently charged with theft of services for his failure to pay the bail-bond company in violation of Ark. Code Ann. 5-36-104. The circuit court granted Defendant's motion for directed verdict, finding that the State had failed to present sufficient evidence that Defendant had violated section 5-36-104. The State appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the State is not allowed to appeal from a directed verdict acquitting the defendant when the sole issue is the sufficiency of the evidence of the defendant's guilt. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an inmate, filed a petition for postconviction relief. Petitioner was represented in the proceeding by his retained attorney (Attorney). No appeal was taken from the order, and Petitioner filed a pro se motion in the Supreme Court seeking to proceed with a belated appeal, contending that he instructed Attorney on the day the order denying postconviction relief was entered to perfect an appeal from the order. The Court remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether Attorney was informed by Petitioner within the time period allowed for filing a notice of appeal that Petitioner desired to appeal from the order. The circuit court determined that Petitioner had sufficiently informed Attorney of his desire to appeal and that Attorney was obligated to file a notice of appeal. Accordingly, the Supreme Court granted Petitioner's pro se motion for belated appeal. View "Smith v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of sexual assault in the second degree. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the testimony of a witness regarding a prior inconsistent statement made by the victim should have been allowed into evidence as impeachment evidence, and because the victim's credibility was a major consideration for the jury, the error was not harmless; and (2) pursuant to Bing v. State, the circuit court erred by admitting hearsay evidence when it allowed the victim's father to testify as to what she had told him about the incident one month after it occurred. View "Scamardo v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant, an inmate, filed a petition for postconviction relief, which the trial court denied. Appellant appealed and filed two motions asserting that the record on appeal was incomplete, that the missing portions were necessary for preparation of his brief, and that, as a result of the omission, the proceedings to convict him were rendered void. The Supreme Court treated the two motions, in part, as motions to supplement the record. The Court then granted the motions in part, issuing a writ of certiorari for the circuit court clerk to provide a supplemental record containing the transcript and record of the plea-and-arraignment hearing that was referenced in the order denying postconviction relief. View "Rice v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of residential burglary and attempted rape. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions and sentence. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief and a petition for writ of habeas corpus, asserting he was entitled to DNA testing of hair recovered from the crime scene in light of a newly available method of testing. The circuit court denied relief. Appellant appealed, arguing that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying his request to test the additional hairs found at the crime scene. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not clearly err in denying Appellant's request, as none of the evidence that might potentially result from the testing of the two additional hairs as sought by Appellant would raise a reasonable probability that Appellant did not commit the offense. View "Pankau v. State" on Justia Law

Appellants, state police officers, brought this suit individually and on behalf of a class consisting of members of the Arkansas State Police Retirement System (ASPRS), contending that various state defendants had violated the law by failing to properly fund the ASPRS between 1992 and 2003 and that the improper funding violated the Arkansas Constitution. The circuit court dismissed some of Appellants' claims and remanded. On remand, the circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendants. On appeal, Appellants asserted that the circuit court erred in finding that a uniform and travel-expense allowance provided for in Ark. Code Ann. 12-8-209 was not reportable to the ASPRS as a portion of payroll pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 24-6-209(a). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 24-6-209(a) does not include a uniform and travel-expense allowance such that it is reportable to ASPRS for purposes of calculating retirement benefits. View "McLemore v. Weiss" on Justia Law

Appellant was a police department officer when he arrested Appellee for disorderly conduct and refusal to submit to arrest. Appellee was convicted of both offenses. The circuit court subsequently overturned the disorderly-conduct conviction. Appellee brought suit against Appellant in his individual and official capacities in the U.S. district court. After Appellee's federal case was dismissed, she brought suit against Appellant in his individual and official capacities in state court. The suit was virtually identical to the suit brought in federal court. Appellant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Appellee's cause of action was barred by collateral estoppel and that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The circuit court denied Appellant's motion, and Appellant brought this interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) Appellant was entitled to qualified immunity on Appellee's right-to-remonstrate claim; and (2) collateral estoppel barred the remaining claims. View "Graham v. Cawthorn" on Justia Law