Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was the Firefighter's Rule, which provides that a professional firefighter may not recover damages from a private party for injuries he or she sustained while putting out a fire even if the private party's negligence caused the fire and injury. Appellant, individually and as executrix of the estate of Decedent and on behalf of Decedent's wrongful-death beneficiaries, filed a wrongful-death and survival claim against Appellee. Decedent, a roadside-assistance worker, had stopped to assist Appellee, whose truck was stalled on the interstate, when Decedent was hit by another truck driving on the interstate. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Appellee, concluding that the Rule precludes a professional rescuer from recovering for injuries inherent in the types of dangers "generally associated with that particular rescue activity." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the risk Decedent undertook was part of his employment as a roadside assistance worker, and therefore, the Rule barred Appellant's claims against Appellee; and (2) a genuine issue of material fact did not exist as to whether Appellee's running out of fuel constituted willful or wanton misconduct. View "Nowicki v. Pigue" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Appellant was convicted of first- and second-degree battery. The court of appeals affirmed on appeal. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1, claiming that his trial counsel was ineffective for several reasons, that the circuit court erred in denying relief on his claims of constitutional error, and that the circuit court did not make required findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court denied the petition without a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in its judgment. View "Moten v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of theft of property, and one count of second-degree battery. After the court of appeals affirmed on direct appeal, Appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court denied the petition after a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that trial counsel was not ineffective (1) for failing to move for a directed verdict at trial, as a directed-verdict motion would not have been successful; (2) for "opening the door" to certain testimony, as counsel's tactical decision about how to cross-examine the witness was supported by reasonable professional judgment; and (3) in investigating and preparing Appellant's case. View "Mason v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant entered a negotiated plea of guilty to two counts of murder in the first degree, attempted murder in the first degree, and battery in the first degree after crashing his truck into his estranged wife's vehicle, killing a pregnant passenger and her unborn daughter. A jury was empaneled to determine Appellant's sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed the sentence imposed, holding (1) Appellant's argument that the circuit court erred in admitting certain Ark. R. Evid. 404(b) evidence in the sentencing phase was not preserved for appeal; and (2) the circuit court did not err by failing to grant a mistrial after certain comments were made by the prosecutor during closing statements. View "Johnson v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial in 1992, Appellant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. In 2011, Appellant filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Act 1780 of 2001, seeking scientific testing of a cigarette butt found in an ashtray at the victim's home where the victim's body was discovered. The trial court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the testing of the cigarette butt would not produce new material evidence or raise a reasonable probability that Appellant did not commit the murder, and therefore, Appellant was not entitled to have the cigarette butt tested pursuant to Act 1780. View "Hall v. State" on Justia Law

After a second jury trial in 2012, Appellant was convicted of four counts of capital murder and one count of kidnapping. Appellant was sentenced to four terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the capital-murder convictions. Appellant's original convictions and sentences were reversed and remanded by the Supreme Court based on the circuit court's error in allowing the State to present reputation and other bad-acts evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's 2012 convictions and sentences, holding, among other things, that the circuit court did not prejudicially err when it (1) denied Appellant's motion for directed verdicts for capital murder and kidnapping; (2) admitted out-of-court statements made by Appellant's son; (3) denied Appellant's motion for mistrial; (4) gave jury instructions on accomplice liability; (5) denied Appellant's challenge to a certain juror for cause; (6) failed to rule on Appellant's motion to settle the record; and (7) amended its judgment-and-sentencing order. View "Green v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant served as constable for a township in Greene County from 2008 to 2012. In 2011, Greene County set constable salaries at $25 per month. Appellant later submitted claims for reimbursement of expenses incurred while working as constable to Greene County. The County denied the claims. Appellant appealed the order denying his claims for expenses and also filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking to have the ordinance setting the salaries for constables declared arbitrary and capricious and therefore unconstitutional. The circuit court consolidated the actions, denied Appellant's claim for reimbursement of expenses, and found that the ordinance setting the salary for constables was constitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Appellant's claim for expenses and that the Greene County ordinance setting constable salaries at $25 per month was not unconstitutional. View "Graves v. Greene County" on Justia Law

Appellant, an inmate in the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC), filed a pro se civil-rights action against Appellees, two ADC officers, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging use of excessive force and failure to protect as well as abuse of authority. Appellant also alleged state-law claims of assault and battery and negligence. The trial court dismissed the case on the basis that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations and immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's claims were barred by the statute of limitations, and therefore, it was unnecessary to reach the issue of immunity or to address Appellant's remaining points on appeal. View "Early v. Baker" on Justia Law

Diamante, LLC (Diamante) operated a private-membership golf club. There were 450 privately owned lots around the golf club and clubhouse that were located in two subdivisions. Supplemental declarations of covenants and restrictions ran with the land and created certain obligations and restrictions, called tie-in rights, that required, among other things, lot owners to become full golf members of the Diamante Country Club and to pay monthly dues to the Club. Appellees filed a declaratory judgment action asking the circuit court to declare the tie-in rights unenforceable due to Diamante's failure to collect monthly dues from all full golf members. Appellees filed a motion for class certification. The circuit court certified the class, defining the class as current owners of the 450 lots in the subdivisions with limited exclusions. Diamante appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting class certification. View "Diamante, LLC v. Dye" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery and theft of property. No appeal was taken. Appellant later filed a pro se petition for writ of error coram nobis, alleging that the trial court erred in declining to grant a continuance, to consider certain proof that Appellant was mentally deficient, to admit certain evidence at trial, and to suspend proceedings so a psychological evaluation could be conducted on Appellant. The trial court court denied the petition. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal, holding that because Appellant did not raise a claim within the scope of a coram-nobis proceeding, the trial court did not err in denying the petition. View "Croston v. State" on Justia Law