Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Mother and Father were divorced by decree that awarded joint legal custody of the parties' minor child and primary physical custody to Mother. Both parties remarried after the divorce. Mother subsequently filed a motion for change of custody seeking sole custody, alleging that a material change in circumstances had occurred because her current spouse was being transferred to Texas. Father counterclaimed for sole custody. The circuit court awarded a change of custody of the child to Father. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the circuit court correctly found that the parties enjoyed a true joint-custody relationship despite the designation of Mother as "primary physical custodian" of the child, the circuit court did not err in failing to apply the Hollandsworth v. Knyzewski presumption in favor of Mother; and (2) Mother's argument that the circuit court erred in failing to articulate the analysis it used in granting a change of custody was without merit. View "Singletary v. Singletary" on Justia Law

Appellant, an inmate in the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC), filed a pro se petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against Appellees, certain ADC correctional officers, alleging excessive use of force, negligence, failure to protect, and due-process and equal-protection violations. The circuit court granted Appellees' motion to dismiss on the ground that allowing Appellant to proceed with the action in forma pauperis would violate the three-strike rule embodied in Ark. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Appellant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in dismissing his complaint and that the "imminent danger" exception to the three-strike rule applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to demonstrate any error in the dismissal of his complaint. View "Pitts v. Rafter" on Justia Law

In 1981, Appellant and two other persons were charged with capital felony murder and attempted capital felony murder. The jury only returned a sentence of life imprisonment on the capital-felony-murder charge. In 2010, Appellant filed a petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1, arguing that the sentence imposed for the capital felony murder was void. The Supreme Court denied the petition. In 2012, Appellant filed a pro se motion to adjust sentence, alleging that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury to impose separate sentences for capital murder and attempted capital murder. The trial court dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that postconviction relief was unavailable because Appellant filed the motion to adjust the sentence in the trial court without having obtained the Supreme Court's leave to do so. View "Moss v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of one count of rape and four counts of possession of drug paraphernalia. More than ninety days after Defendant's conviction, Defendant's trial counsel filed a notice of appeal and did not file an extension to complete the record. Defendant filed a motion for rule on clerk, contending that his appeal was filed late as a result of his attorney's failure to request an extension to complete the record. The Supreme Court remanded to the circuit court for a determination as to whether the attorney was asked to perfect the appeal. On remand, the circuit court found that the attorney had been asked to perfect the appeal. The Supreme Court subsequently granted Defendant's second motion for rule on clerk, as he showed good cause to proceed. View "McCulley v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced as a habitual offender to life imprisonment. Appellant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress an incriminating statement that he made after he unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's statement that he had already told officers all the he knew during an interrogation was not an unambiguous and unequivocal invocation of his right to remain silent, and therefore, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress. View "Fritts v. State" on Justia Law

Johnny Washington died after his 1994 Ford Explorer was struck by another vehicle driven by Karah Williams and rolled over twice. Johnny suffered a fatal head injury when his head exited the vehicle during the rollover and was crushed. Paulette Washington, Johnny's wife, filed a complaint against Ford Motor Company, asserting claims for, among other things, negligence, strict liability, failure to warn, and breach of warranties. A jury returned a verdict finding that both Ford and Williams, equally, had been the proximate cause of Johnny's death. Following a second remand, the circuit court entered an order awarding judgment against Ford in the amount of $7,152,125. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in excluding evidence of Johnny's nonuse of a seat belt; (2) did not err in determining that the defective-glass claim was not preempted by Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 205; (3) did not err in denying Ford's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the issue of punitive damages; (4) did not err in failing to reduce the jury's compensatory-damages award; and (5) erred in including a nunc pro tunc provision for postjudgment-interest purposes. View "Ford Motor Co. v. Washington" on Justia Law

Appellant entered a negotiated plea of guilty to multiple felony offenses. Four years later, Appellant filed a pro se petition for writ of error coram nobis, alleging that he was not afforded effective assistance of counsel in the plea proceeding and that the trial court did not follow proper procedure when the guilty plea was entered. The trial court denied the petition. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal and declared his motion for extension of time to file his brief-in-chief moot, holding (1) Appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not within the purview of a coram-nobis proceeding; and (2) Appellant's argument regarding the trial court's procedure could have been raised at the time the plea was entered, and Appellant's claim that his plea was coerced did not demonstrate that a writ of error coram nobis should issue. View "Edwards v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of capital murder and three counts of unlawful discharge of a firearm from a vehicle. Because the State waived the death penalty, the circuit court automatically sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for his capital murder conviction. The circuit court also sentenced Defendant as a habitual offender to terms of imprisonment for the unlawful-discharge convictions and for a firearm enhancement. Defendant appealed, claiming that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the circuit court, instead of the jury, assessed the sentences for the firearm enhancement and the unlawful-discharge convictions. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded because the circuit court failed to make adequate findings of fact on this issue. On remand, the circuit court again denied Defendant's petition for postconviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed because Defendant did not assert any claim of prejudice, which made it unnecessary for the Court to review the circuit court's finding that counsel's representation was not deficient. View "Davenport v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed this action against Respondents, her former employer and former supervisor, asserting retaliation claims pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 16-123-108. After the case was removed to federal court, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the claims as time-barred, arguing that the one-year statute of limitations period pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 16-123-107(c)(3) of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act should apply. The federal district court asked the Arkansas Supreme Court to accept a certified question to decide the appropriate statute-of-limitations period applicable to section 16-123-108 claims. The Supreme Court answered by holding that the three-year statute-of limitations period provided in Ark. Code Ann. 16-56-105 applies to retaliation claims filed pursuant to section 16-123-108. View "Smith v. ConAgra Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1989, Steve Rose and Harbor East, Inc. entered into a consent judgment that awarded Rose $176,000. In 2009, Rose filed a motion to revive the judgment, and an order reviving the judgment was entered. Rose then filed a complaint in foreclosure against Harbor East Property Owners Association (the POA) and Recreational Management, Inc. (Recreational) maintaining that the judgment had not been satisfied. In 2012, the POA filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that because no writ of scire facias had been issued prior to the 2009 order of revivor, Rose's judgment was not revived under the terms of Ark. Code Ann. 16-65-501, and therefore, the 2009 order of revivor was void ab initio for lack of jurisdiction. The circuit court granted the summary judgment motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the POA and Recreational were allowed to collaterally attack Rose's 2009 order of revivor because the order was void due to Rose's failure to satisfy the requirements of section 16-65-501. View "Rose v. Harbor E., Inc." on Justia Law