Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
ROBINSON NURSING AND REHABILITATION CENTER, LLC v. PHILLIPS
A group of plaintiffs, including the personal representative of a deceased resident’s estate and other similarly situated individuals, brought a class action against a nursing and rehabilitation facility. The complaint, filed in 2015, alleged chronic understaffing, breach of contract, violations of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, negligence, civil conspiracy, and unjust enrichment. The class was defined as all residents at the facility from June 2010 onward.After initial certification, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed some claims but reversed on negligence. The focus then shifted to whether the facility could compel arbitration under various resident agreements. The Pulaski County Circuit Court denied a 2017 motion to compel arbitration as to some residents, which the Supreme Court partly affirmed and partly reversed. Subsequent appeals and remands required the circuit court to make specific findings for each agreement. The latest orders reviewed involved 227 residents: the court granted arbitration as to 112 and denied it for 115, based on issues such as authority of signatories and ambiguities in the agreements.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed whether the circuit court correctly denied arbitration for the 115 residents. The court held that, except for three residents (for whom the circuit court exceeded its mandate), the denials were correct because the arbitration agreements were procedurally unconscionable. This was due to the agreements being a condition of admission, unequal bargaining power, and the facility’s failure to disclose an ongoing class action. The court reversed the denials for the three residents and reinstated prior orders compelling arbitration for them. The cross-appeal regarding orders granting arbitration was dismissed because such orders are not immediately appealable. The direct appeal was therefore affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part, and the cross-appeal dismissed. View "ROBINSON NURSING AND REHABILITATION CENTER, LLC v. PHILLIPS" on Justia Law
CALVERT v. THE CITY OF CONWAY, ARKANSAS
Paul Calvert owned several rental properties in Conway, Arkansas. Over several years, the City cited these properties for various code violations, including the presence of trash, dilapidated structures, and health hazards. When Calvert did not resolve the violations, the City performed cleanups, billed him for the costs, and, after hearings, placed liens on three properties—512 Third Avenue, 1135 Ash Street, and 1900/1902 Dave Ward Drive. Calvert did not always attend the hearings, and some invoices were paid by tenants or through sale proceeds when the properties were sold.Calvert filed suit in the Faulkner County Circuit Court, challenging the liens and raising additional claims, including alleged violations of due process, unlawful search and seizure, excessive fines, and seeking a declaratory judgment. The circuit court found that Calvert’s appeals of the liens for the Third Avenue and Ash Street properties were untimely and dismissed them for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The lien on the Dave Ward property was found to be moot because it was paid when Calvert sold the property and there was no evidence the lien affected the sale price. On Calvert’s other claims, the court granted summary judgment to the City, finding adequate notice and opportunity to be heard, that the search was conducted under a valid warrant, and that the City acted within its authority.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the appeal. It affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of the lien appeals, agreeing that the first two were untimely and the third was moot. The court also affirmed summary judgment on Calvert’s constitutional and statutory claims, holding that he did not present sufficiently developed legal arguments or evidence, and that the City acted under the appropriate statutory authority. View "CALVERT v. THE CITY OF CONWAY, ARKANSAS" on Justia Law
BURNETT V. G&T ENTERPRISES OF NLR, LLC
The appellant was the director of the Arkansas Towing and Recovery Board and was sued in his individual capacity for tortious interference with contract. The plaintiff, a towing company, had a longstanding contract with a local Wal-Mart to remove abandoned or illegally parked vehicles. The complaint alleged that the director, who had close ties to a competing towing company and its owners, used his position and influence to encourage Wal-Mart managers to terminate their contract with the plaintiff and sign with the competing company. The plaintiff also claimed that the director made misleading and coercive statements to Wal-Mart staff and conducted a sting operation targeting the plaintiff’s tow operator, resulting in harm to its business and reputation.The case was initially reviewed by the Pulaski County Circuit Court. The competing towing company and its owners moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, while the director filed a separate motion to dismiss, asserting both sovereign and statutory immunity. The circuit court denied all motions to dismiss, allowing the case to proceed. The director appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss on the grounds of immunity, pursuant to Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure–Civil Rule 2(a)(10).The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the circuit court’s denial of the director’s motion to dismiss. Applying the statutory immunity standard, the court found that the plaintiff failed to allege facts establishing that the director’s actions were malicious or constituted a conscious violation of the law without just cause. As a result, the director was entitled to statutory immunity. The court reversed the circuit court’s order and dismissed the complaint against the director. The court also clarified that sovereign immunity did not apply because the director was sued in his individual capacity. View "BURNETT V. G&T ENTERPRISES OF NLR, LLC" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law
MCCUE v. DIRECTOR, ARKANSAS DIVISION OF WORKFORCE SERVICES
An art educator working for a school district escorted a group of students between classrooms. During this process, a five-year-old student left the line without permission to retrieve crayons. The educator did not notice the child's absence and continued with the other students. Shortly thereafter, another teacher found the missing student unharmed. The school district cited the educator for violating its supervision policy and terminated her employment after a hearing. She subsequently applied for unemployment benefits.The Arkansas Division of Workforce Services denied her application, finding that she was disqualified for benefits due to misconduct connected with her work, specifically for leaving a child unattended. The Appeal Tribunal affirmed this denial, as did the Arkansas Division of Workforce Services Board of Review, which concluded that her negligence was sufficiently serious to manifest wrongful intent or evil design. The educator appealed to the Arkansas Court of Appeals, which reversed and remanded the Board’s decision. She then petitioned the Supreme Court of Arkansas for review.The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that the record did not contain substantial evidence that the educator’s conduct rose to the level of misconduct required by Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-514. The court clarified that statutory disqualification for unemployment benefits requires either a violation of behavioral policy with knowledge or willfulness, or intentional poor performance, neither of which was established by the evidence. The court reversed the Board of Review’s decision, remanded for an award of benefits, and vacated the Court of Appeals’ opinion. View "MCCUE v. DIRECTOR, ARKANSAS DIVISION OF WORKFORCE SERVICES" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Public Benefits
WRIGHT v. STATE OF ARKANSAS
A masked individual entered Plato’s Closet in Jonesboro, Arkansas, threatened employees with what appeared to be a handgun, and stole $598 before fleeing in a gray Mercury sedan. Shortly after, law enforcement stopped Pierre Wright, who was driving a vehicle matching the description. Officers found clothing matching the suspect’s, an imitation firearm, and a Plato’s Closet bag containing $598 in the car. Additional evidence, including GPS and cell-phone data, further linked Wright to the crime.The State charged Wright with aggravated robbery and theft of property and sought to classify him as a habitual offender based on prior Tennessee convictions. At trial in the Craighead County Circuit Court, Wright moved for directed verdicts, arguing insufficient evidence of his identity as the robber. The circuit court denied these motions, and the jury found Wright guilty. During sentencing, the State introduced certified records of Wright’s prior Tennessee convictions—one for aggravated robbery and two for aggravated burglary—and argued that the Tennessee aggravated-burglary offenses were comparable to Arkansas’s aggravated residential burglary, making Wright eligible for a mandatory life sentence under Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-501(d). The circuit court agreed and imposed the life sentence.On appeal to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, Wright raised three arguments: the sufficiency of the evidence, the comparability of his Tennessee convictions to Arkansas offenses for sentencing enhancement, and the propriety of his mandatory life sentence. The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in finding the Tennessee aggravated-burglary convictions comparable to the Arkansas statute, and that the mandatory life sentence was proper. The Court affirmed the judgment and sentence. View "WRIGHT v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law
OLD DOMINION FREIGHT LINE, INC. v. MCMILLION
Six men, including two law enforcement officers and four members of a towing crew, responded to a tractor-trailer accident in St. Francis County, Arkansas, in April 2018. The accident involved an Old Dominion Freight Line truck transporting a 565-pound barrel of formic acid, a hazardous material. Although federal law did not require placarding for this volume, Old Dominion’s driver failed to disclose the presence of hazardous material when asked by emergency responders. The responders were subsequently exposed to toxic fumes, resulting in permanent respiratory and related injuries. All six men sought emergency medical care and later brought negligence claims against Old Dominion and its driver, seeking compensatory and punitive damages.The St. Francis County Circuit Court held a jury trial, which resulted in a verdict for the plaintiffs, awarding them $75 million in compensatory damages and finding no liability for punitive damages. The defendants' post-trial motions for a new trial or remittitur were denied by operation of law. On appeal, the Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and ordered a new trial, finding the compensatory damages unsupported by substantial evidence. The parties petitioned for review, which the Supreme Court of Arkansas granted, treating the case as if originally filed there.The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the circuit court’s judgment and vacated the court of appeals’ opinion. It held that, given the immediate and acute toxic exposure, a heightened causation standard was not required, and that the evidence—including expert medical testimony—was sufficient to support the jury’s proximate cause finding. The court further held that the plaintiffs’ claims were not preempted by federal law, the professional-rescuer’s doctrine did not bar recovery, and the evidentiary and procedural rulings below were not abuses of discretion. Finally, the court found the damages award was supported by substantial evidence and was not so excessive as to shock the conscience. View "OLD DOMINION FREIGHT LINE, INC. v. MCMILLION" on Justia Law
H.C. v. NESMITH
Four individuals alleged that they were sexually abused as children by James Nesmith, a pediatric doctor and church counselor, between 1995 and 2007. They claimed the abuse occurred during medical visits, at home, and at a church camp. Their lawsuit sought damages for sexual assault, sexual battery, and infliction of extreme emotional distress under Arkansas tort law and a statute granting crime victims a cause of action. However, the plaintiffs did not file their claims within the standard limitations periods applicable to such actions. Instead, they relied on the Justice for Vulnerable Victims of Sex Abuse Act, which revived and extended the statute of limitations for child sex abuse claims within a specific timeframe. The parties conceded that the plaintiffs’ complaint was filed within the revived window provided by the Act.James Nesmith moved for summary judgment in the Pulaski County Circuit Court, arguing that under the Arkansas Supreme Court’s existing vested-rights precedent, the General Assembly lacked the authority to revive claims that were already time-barred, rendering the Act invalid and the claims untimely. The circuit court agreed and dismissed the complaint on statute of limitations grounds. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed, citing binding precedent that prohibited legislative revival of expired claims.The Supreme Court of Arkansas granted review and reversed the lower courts’ decisions. The court overruled its prior vested-rights precedent, finding no constitutional basis for categorically prohibiting the legislature from reviving time-barred claims through legislation. It upheld the Justice for Vulnerable Victims of Sex Abuse Act, concluding that the General Assembly has the authority to set or extend statutes of limitations, including for previously barred claims. The court reversed the circuit court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, and vacated the opinion of the court of appeals. View "H.C. v. NESMITH" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Personal Injury
MCCOY v. STATE OF ARKANSAS
On October 18, 2022, a fatal shooting occurred in the parking lot of The Ridge apartment complex in Little Rock, Arkansas. The evidence at trial established that Ferrad McCoy traveled with Mason Abraham from Memphis to Little Rock, where Abraham, as the passenger in a white Infiniti, shot and killed Broderick Blueford. Law enforcement later pursued the same vehicle on Interstate 40, resulting in a high-speed chase and crash. Both McCoy and Abraham fled on foot but were apprehended nearby. Physical evidence, including firearms, shell casings, a cell phone, and a hoodie matching McCoy’s attire, as well as video footage and cell phone records, linked both men to the crime and location.The Pulaski County Circuit Court presided over a jury trial in which McCoy was convicted of capital murder, first-degree unlawful discharge of a firearm from a vehicle, and firearm enhancements. He received life imprisonment plus additional years for the enhancements. McCoy challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and objected to the admission of several items, including photographs, firearms, video footage, and a “BOLO” flyer. He also raised issues regarding jury instructions and the Confrontation Clause.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case, applying the substantial evidence standard and broad discretion for evidentiary rulings. The Court held that there was substantial evidence to support the convictions, properly admitted the contested evidence, and found no reversible error in the circuit court’s rulings. The Court also determined that McCoy’s jury instruction and Confrontation Clause arguments were either waived or without merit. The convictions and sentences imposed by the Pulaski County Circuit Court were affirmed. View "MCCOY v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
BROWN v. STATE OF ARKANSAS
The case centers on a man who shot and killed his wife in their Little Rock home. In the days leading up to the incident, he sent her a series of threatening and incoherent text messages, suggesting jealousy and intent to cause harm. On the day of the shooting, a family friend visited the home and left his .40-caliber Glock handgun on the couch. After an argument between the husband and wife, the friend heard gunshots as he was leaving. He returned to find the wife dead and the husband present but the handgun missing. The husband fled the scene and was later apprehended in Texas, having changed his appearance. During his time in jail, he instructed his daughter to lie to investigators about the nature of his relationship with his wife and whether there had been any conflict.The Pulaski County Circuit Court presided over the trial. During the proceedings, the defendant requested to dismiss his retained counsel midtrial, expressing dissatisfaction with his representation, but had not arranged for another attorney and did not wish to represent himself. The circuit court denied the request, citing the length of time the case had been pending and the absence of substitute counsel. At trial’s conclusion, the jury found him guilty of first-degree murder, a lesser-included offense of the original capital murder charge, and imposed a sentence of life imprisonment plus fifteen years for a firearm enhancement.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed whether the circuit court erred in denying the motion to change counsel and whether there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction. The Supreme Court held that substantial evidence supported the verdict and that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the last-minute motion to change counsel. The conviction and sentence were affirmed. View "BROWN v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
FRANKLIN v. STATE OF ARKANSAS
The case concerns Christopher Franklin, who was serving as the mayor of Helena-West Helena, Arkansas. The State filed a lawsuit against Franklin in June 2025, alleging that he had abused his office and committed various illegal acts. The State sought civil penalties, damages, attorneys’ fees, and Franklin’s removal from office. Unusually, instead of the circuit court clerk issuing and signing the summons as required, the circuit court judge did so after the State handed him the complaint in open court. The next day, the documents were filed with the clerk, and the court issued an ex parte temporary restraining order removing Franklin from his mayoral duties.Franklin responded by filing several motions, including one to dismiss the case on the ground that the summons was defective because it had not been signed by the clerk or a deputy clerk. Despite Franklin’s objections, the Phillips County Circuit Court imposed penalties, awarded attorneys’ fees, and removed him from office. Franklin then filed a motion under Rule 60(a) to vacate the orders, which was deemed denied by operation of law. He appealed the case.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed whether the summons was valid and whether Franklin had waived his objection. The court held that the summons was constitutionally defective because only the clerk or a deputy clerk may sign a summons, not a judge. Since the State did not serve Franklin with a valid summons within the required 120 days, the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction. The court also determined that Franklin did not waive his objection. As a result, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed the circuit court’s orders, vacated all actions taken, and dismissed the case without prejudice. View "FRANKLIN v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure