Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A bank made a $1.9 million loan secured by a mortgage on over 750 acres of real property. About a year later, a portion of the property was sold to a third party, who financed the purchase with a loan from a second bank. During the closing, a vice president of the first bank assured the title company that the bank would release its mortgage on the sold parcel. Relying on this representation, the title company distributed the proceeds, and the second bank lent money for the purchase. Years later, the first bank attempted to enforce its mortgage against the property, claiming its lien was superior to the interests of the second bank and the purchaser.The Lincoln County Circuit Court heard the case after the original borrowers filed for bankruptcy, which stayed claims against them except for breach of contract and foreclosure. The first bank obtained a default judgment for breach of contract against the borrower, but the case continued against the subsequent purchaser and the second bank. These parties moved for summary judgment, arguing the first bank was estopped from asserting its lien due to its agent’s prior representation. The circuit court granted summary judgment in their favor, and the first bank appealed. The Arkansas Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of a final order due to ambiguous abandonment of unresolved claims.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and held that the first bank’s abandonment of pending claims in its notice of appeal was sufficient for finality, allowing the appeal to proceed. On the merits, the court found no disputed material facts regarding the agent’s authority or the parties’ reliance on the representation. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that equitable estoppel barred the first bank from enforcing its lien under these circumstances. The opinion of the Court of Appeals was vacated. View "RELYANCE BANK, N.A. v. PHARR" on Justia Law

A company sought to operate a red-dirt surface mine on approximately twenty acres in a part of Washington County that was zoned for agricultural and single-family residential uses. The company, operating as Heritage Farms, applied for a conditional use permit, which the Washington County Planning Board considered and ultimately denied. The company then appealed this denial to the Washington County Quorum Court, which upheld the Planning Board’s decision and adopted an ordinance reflecting the denial. The company further appealed to the Washington County Circuit Court. During the circuit court proceedings, several local residents and a neighborhood association were allowed to intervene. The company moved for summary judgment, arguing that the denial was arbitrary and capricious, while the intervenors and county argued that the proper standard of review was arbitrary and capricious because the action was legislative, and that there was a rational basis for the denial.The Washington County Circuit Court found that the quorum court’s denial of the permit was a legislative act and thus applied the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review. The court also held that Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-17-211 was unconstitutional to the extent that it permitted de novo review of legislative zoning decisions. Applying the arbitrary-and-capricious standard, the circuit court concluded there was a rational basis for the denial and affirmed the quorum court’s action. The Arkansas Court of Appeals then affirmed the circuit court’s order.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and held that the denial of the conditional use permit was a quasi-judicial act, not a legislative one, because it involved applying existing ordinance provisions to the facts of the application rather than creating new law. Therefore, the circuit court should have conducted a de novo review rather than applying the arbitrary-and-capricious standard. The Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed the circuit court’s judgment, vacated the Court of Appeals’ opinion, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "MMSC, LLC V. WASHINGTON COUNTY, ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

A parent, acting on behalf of a minor, filed a complaint in the Pulaski County Circuit Court alleging sex trafficking of the minor at a hotel in North Little Rock, Arkansas. After the complaint was amended, two national hotel franchisors were added as defendants. When these corporate defendants responded, their answer was signed only by their Arkansas attorney of record, but the pleading also listed three out-of-state attorneys, including two for whom a motion for pro hac vice admission was noted as forthcoming. The out-of-state attorneys did not sign the pleading.Subsequently, the corporate defendants filed petitions for pro hac vice admission for the two out-of-state attorneys, providing the required affidavits and fee payments. The Circuit Court denied the petitions, citing the inclusion of the out-of-state attorneys’ names on the earlier pleading as appearing before admission. A motion for reconsideration was also denied. The defendants appealed, arguing that the denial was an abuse of discretion and not supported by any rule. The appellees did not file a response. The Arkansas Supreme Court granted a stay of circuit court proceedings pending the appeal.The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that an order denying pro hac vice admission is immediately appealable since it deprives a party of counsel of choice, functionally equivalent to a disqualification. The court found that the Circuit Court abused its discretion by denying the petitions based solely on the listing of the out-of-state attorneys’ names with a clear indication of their pending pro hac vice status. The applicable rules did not prohibit such a listing, nor did it constitute an unauthorized appearance. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court’s orders and remanded for further proceedings. View "RED ROOF INNS, INC. V. DOE" on Justia Law

A substitute teacher employed by a staffing agency regularly worked in a school district where her child was a student. After a dispute arose between her and her child’s teacher, she filed an ethics complaint regarding the teacher’s conduct with the Arkansas Department of Education. Subsequently, the school district informed the staffing agency that she should not substitute at the school during the investigation, and later extended this prohibition to all district schools. She was still able to work at other schools in the county contracted with the agency. The state ultimately found her complaint baseless.She filed suit alleging that the district and two administrators retaliated against her in violation of federal and state law, including the Rehabilitation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act. The Saline County Circuit Court granted her partial summary judgment, finding liability on her claims, and the jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages. The court also issued a permanent injunction preventing the district from barring her employment as a substitute.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and held that her Rehabilitation Act claim failed because she was not an employee of the district, as required for such claims. For her § 1983 and Arkansas Civil Rights Act claims, the court found she had not established liability against the district or the administrators. Specifically, she did not show that the district acted under an official policy or custom, nor did her speech constitute a matter of public concern protected by the Constitution in the context of a government contractor relationship. The court also vacated the permanent injunction, as no substantive claim survived.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed the circuit court’s summary judgment rulings, the jury’s damages award, and the order granting a permanent injunction, and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the appellants. View "BENTON SCHOOL DISTRICT v. GREER" on Justia Law

Rebecca Nichols was employed as a truck driver and was injured in an accident when her tractor-trailer overturned. She believed the crash was caused by improperly secured steel coils loaded into the trailer by other parties. Nichols retained attorneys to pursue a negligence claim against those responsible for loading and securing the cargo. The attorneys filed suit, but failed to timely identify and serve the proper defendants before the statute of limitations expired. Subsequent attempts to amend the complaint to add or substitute additional parties were unsuccessful, and Nichols’s underlying tort action was ultimately dismissed with prejudice.After the dismissal, Nichols filed a legal malpractice suit against her former attorneys in the Pulaski County Circuit Court, Fifth Division. She alleged that their failure to timely investigate and properly name the responsible parties, as well as their failure to effect timely service, deprived her of the opportunity to recover damages for her injuries. The circuit court initially granted the attorneys’ motion to dismiss, finding the malpractice claim time-barred, but the Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed and remanded, holding that Nichols had sufficiently pled fraudulent concealment to toll the statute of limitations.On remand, after discovery and a series of evidentiary rulings excluding key evidence and testimony Nichols sought to introduce, the circuit court granted summary judgment for the defendants. It concluded that Nichols could not, as a matter of law, prove that the attorneys’ actions were the proximate cause of her loss, because she was unable to present admissible evidence to establish the identity of the alleged tortfeasors or to demonstrate that she would have prevailed in her underlying claim.The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that Nichols failed to establish an essential element of her malpractice claim—proximate causation—as she did not demonstrate she could prove the merits of the underlying negligence action. The court also affirmed the circuit court’s evidentiary rulings and denial of Nichols’s recusal motion. View "NICHOLS v. SWINDOLL" on Justia Law

Following the discovery of Van Stevens’s brutal murder in Searcy, Arkansas, police identified Christopher Coy Gamble as a suspect based on his proximity to the crime and evidence tying him to the victim’s residence. Gamble, who was on parole at the time, was observed near the crime scene and was linked to incriminating items found at a neighbor’s property, including belongings previously returned to him by police. Surveillance footage, eyewitness accounts, and a custodial statement in which Gamble admitted being in the victim’s home further implicated him, although Gamble denied committing the murder.The White County Circuit Court conducted a jury trial, during which Gamble moved to suppress his custodial statement, arguing it resulted from a pretextual arrest, and sought to strike the venire after a potential juror expressed an opinion of his guilt. The circuit court denied both motions, finding no grounds for suppression or for striking the jury panel, and a jury subsequently convicted Gamble of capital murder and aggravated residential burglary, resulting in life and sixty-year sentences, respectively.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case. On appeal, Gamble challenged the denial of his suppression motion, relying on State v. Sullivan, which barred pretextual arrests under the Arkansas Constitution. The Supreme Court of Arkansas overruled Sullivan, holding that Arkansas’s constitutional standard mirrors the federal “reasonableness” test: an arrest is lawful if supported by probable cause, regardless of the officer’s subjective motivation. The court concluded Gamble’s arrest was proper because he possessed drug paraphernalia in the officer’s presence. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying Gamble’s motion to strike the venire, as the circuit court’s admonition sufficiently cured any potential prejudice. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed Gamble’s convictions. View "GAMBLE v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

In January 2019, a shooting occurred at a gas station in Helena-West Helena, Arkansas, resulting in the death of Casey Grant and serious injury to Raymond Clark. Security footage captured the incident, and multiple witnesses, including law enforcement officers familiar with the accused, Vann Bragg, identified him as one of the shooters. Testimony from Bragg’s co-defendant, Robinson, corroborated Bragg’s involvement, as did statements from the surviving victim. Bragg was convicted by a Phillips County jury of first-degree murder and first-degree battery in June 2021.After his conviction, Bragg’s direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Arkansas was unsuccessful, and the court also affirmed the denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. Bragg then filed a timely Rule 37 petition in the Phillips County Circuit Court, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel on several grounds, including failures to challenge witness identifications, introduce impeachment evidence, present an exculpatory affidavit, call his brother as a witness, and investigate or present mitigation evidence at sentencing. The circuit court held a hearing, considered testimony from multiple witnesses, and subsequently denied Bragg’s petition in a detailed order, finding that none of his claims established deficient performance or prejudice as required under Strickland v. Washington.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the circuit court’s denial of the Rule 37 petition for clear error. The court held that Bragg failed to demonstrate either deficient performance by his trial counsel or resulting prejudice under the Strickland standard on any of his claims. The court also found no cumulative error, as no individual errors were established. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Bragg’s Rule 37 petition. View "BRAGG v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

In July 2011, Roschell Lamb reported to police that she had been raped by a stranger who dragged her into a shed and assaulted her. The police investigation initially yielded no suspects, and the case went dormant until 2018, when Roy Nichols was identified as a suspect through DNA evidence. After locating Lamb in 2023, the State charged Nichols with rape. Nichols claims the encounter was consensual and seeks to introduce evidence that he and Lamb had a prior sexual relationship, specifically alleging they had sex weeks before the incident.The Craighead County Circuit Court held an in camera hearing regarding Nichols’s motion to introduce evidence of the alleged prior sexual encounter. Nichols testified about the supposed prior relationship, and his mother and sister claimed Lamb had visited their home looking for Nichols around the time of the alleged rape. The circuit court found Nichols’s testimony about prior consensual sexual conduct probative of consent and allowed him to testify about it and cross-examine Lamb on the topic, but excluded testimony from Nichols’s mother and sister. The State appealed this evidentiary ruling.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the circuit court’s decision for abuse of discretion. It concluded the circuit court erred because Nichols’s claim was uncorroborated, only marginally probative, and highly prejudicial. The Court held that Arkansas’s rape-shield statute generally prohibits introduction of evidence of prior sexual conduct unless it is acutely probative and corroborated. The Court also found that Nichols’s Confrontation Clause argument was unavailing, as he could challenge Lamb’s credibility through other means. The Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed the circuit court’s ruling and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "STATE OF ARKANSAS v. NICHOLS" on Justia Law

A candidate for the Arkansas House of Representatives, District 92, was certified to appear on the Republican primary ballot. Another Arkansas citizen, who did not reside in District 92, sued to have the candidate declared ineligible based on a past guilty plea to a felony public trust crime. The plaintiff sought to prevent election officials from counting or certifying any votes cast for the candidate.The Pulaski County Circuit Court considered the statutory framework that allows any Arkansas citizen to bring an action to enforce eligibility requirements for public office if the responsible prosecuting attorney fails to act. The court found that the prosecuting attorney knew of the candidate’s prior conviction and failed to act, and that the plaintiff, as a citizen, had standing. The court ruled the candidate ineligible to run or hold office and ordered that votes for the candidate not be counted. The court denied the plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees and expenses.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case. It affirmed the circuit court’s findings that the plaintiff had standing, that the prosecuting attorney’s failure to act was sufficient, and that the candidate was ineligible under the plain language of Arkansas’s statutory disqualification provisions for those pleading guilty to public trust crimes, even if records were sealed. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s evidentiary rulings. On cross-appeal, the Supreme Court held that the statute mandates an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses to a prevailing citizen plaintiff. Thus, it reversed the denial of fees and remanded for further proceedings on that issue. The Supreme Court’s disposition was to affirm on the direct appeal and reverse and remand on the cross-appeal. View "Reed v. Yang" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant was convicted by a Drew County jury in 1996 for capital murder during a robbery, based largely on eyewitness identifications, physical evidence linking him to the crime, and his own conflicting statements about his involvement. At trial, two witnesses identified him as fleeing the scene with a weapon, and forensic testimony indicated that the victim’s blood type matched stains found on the appellant’s shirt. The appellant testified that he was outside during the shooting, but earlier statements placed him inside as a lookout. His conviction and life sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. The appellant subsequently filed multiple petitions for postconviction relief. In 2012, he sought DNA testing under Act 1780 of 2001, claiming actual innocence and arguing that DNA analysis of blood evidence would exonerate him. The Drew County Circuit Court denied relief, and the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed, finding he failed to rebut timeliness presumptions. In 2020, he filed another petition, seeking new DNA testing using methods not previously available, such as M-VAC technology, on various items from the crime scene. The circuit court again denied the petition, ruling it was an impermissible successive filing and that the issues had already been decided. The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed this appeal and affirmed the lower court’s decision. It held the petition was both successive and untimely under Arkansas law. The Court found that the appellant’s request for newer DNA testing did not distinguish his claim from earlier petitions in a way sufficient to overcome legal bars or the presumption against timeliness. Additionally, the Court found the proposed testing would not significantly advance a claim of actual innocence, given the weight of the evidence at trial. The Court also concluded that no evidentiary hearing was required under these circumstances. View "HUSSEY v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law